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CASE COMMENTS
ADmNmTRIvE LAw-ScoPE OF JuDICaL REVmw-SuBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE Rtrn.-Proceeding instituted under W. VA. CODE c. 11,

art. 3, § 25 (Michie 1943), to reduce the assessed valuations of
the taxpayer's properties. The county court sitting as a board of
equalization and review upheld the assessed valuations. This order
was affirmed by the circuit court. Held, affirming the circuit court,
the Supreme Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review valuations
of property for tax purposes only when the administrative finding
is not supported by substantial evidence or is so obviously wrong
as to amount to a failure to take cognizance of the constitutional
principles of uniformity of taxation. In re Tax Assessments Against
the Southern Land Company, 100 S.E.2d 555 (W. Va. 1957).
Today it is universally accepted that courts may review administrative findings without violating the constitutional principle of
separation of powers. However, the scope of judicial review remains
a source of controversy. Generally speaking, the decisions of administrative agencies on questions of fact; where they have some reasonable support in the evidence, are final and binding on the court;
but on questions of law, administrative decisions are not final even
where they have some support in the evidence. Botchford v.
Commrr, 81 F.2d 914 (9th Cr. 1936); Oak Lawn Cemetery v. Baltimore County, 174 Md. 280, 198 Ad. 600, 115 A.L.R. 1478 (1938).
The difficulty lies in the right of the courts to review administrative
findings of questions of fact. The basic test for the determination
of such right is the substantial evidence rule.
The term "substantial evidence" first appeared in the Federal
Trade Commission Act § 5 (c), which said, "the findings of the Commission if supported by substantial evidence shall be conclusive."
38 STAT. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(c) (1927). Since this act
it has appeared in some eighteen other federal statutes as the
standard for judicial review. Stason, Substantial Evidence in Administrative Law, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 1026 (1941). The vagueness
of this statutory test has led to a variety of constructions ranging
from the bare minimum of evidence required in the case of Swayne
& Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U.S. 297 (1937), to the requirement that the decision be supported by a preponderance of the
testimony as seen in NLRB v. Thompson Products,Inc., 97 F.2d 63

(6th Cir. 1938).
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There have been many attempts by the courts to define precisely the test. Probably the most often cited is that substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Consolidated Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 805 U.S. 197 (1938). As a result of dissatisfaction
with the too restricted application of the substantial evidence test
by the courts Congress sought to broaden its scope with the enactment of § 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 STAT. 244
(1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1952), which makes the reports of
intermediate courts a part of the record for purposes of review.
In the interpretation of this act in the case of Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 840 U.S. 474 (1951), the Court said that the new
legislation allows consideration of evidence from which conflicting
inferences can be drawn. Thus the courts are no longer precluded
from review when they find substantial evidence on one side, if
there is countervailing evidence on the other. Stated concisely, at
its present stage of development, the doctrine as evidenced by the
Supreme Court decisions is that substantial evidence should be
construed to confer finality upon administrative determinations of
facts when, upon an examination of the whole record, the evidence,
including the inferences therefrom, is found to be such that a reasonable man might have reached the decision.
In West Virginia the initial appearance of the doctrine is found
in the holding of the case of Liberty Coal Co. v. Bassett, 108 W. Va.
293, 150 S.E. 745 (1929). In. Crouch v. Wyoming Court, 116 W.
Va. 476, 181 S.E. 819 (1935), the court declared in the syllabus:
"Where an assessment . . . appears to have been made without
proper regard to requisite elements and to have been approved
by the circuit court without substantial evidence to sustain the
assessed valuation, the appellate court will reverse the circuit
court's order and will remand the case for further proceedings." A
tendency to broaden the scope of judicial review of questions of
fact even further is seen in Western Maryland Ry. v. Board, 124
W. Va. 489, 21 S.E.2d 688 (1942), where the court declared in the
syllabus, "this court will not reverse the order of a circuit court by
which the valuation for taxation of a public utility's property was
reduced on its appeal, except on error of law, or where the court's
action was clearly not supported by a preponderance of the evidence." From the language of these cases and that of the principal
case it is apparent that West Virginia is following the trend of the
Supreme Court in the expansion of judicial review.
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It is questionable whether this trend of expanding the scope
of judicial review of fact determinations is actually desirable. Admittedly the right of appeal is essential as a check on administrative findings, but certain practical and policy considerations should
not be overlooked in an overzealous desire to provide justice. Many
administrative bodies are better qualified than the courts to find the
facts in their particular field; also it is they who confront the witnesses and hear the testimony. Particularly is this true in the case of
federal boards and commissions, such as the National Labor Relations Board and the Federal Trade Commission. As a matter of policy
our administrative agencies will be relegated to uselessness if some
degree of finality is not conferred upon their factual determinations.
I believe that the substantial evidence test is a sound approach
to the present problem of review. However, the test in its present
form will remain necessary only so long as our administrative bodies
remain at a low level of competency. When and if such agencies
achieve a high degree of competency this trend towards liberal
review should subside and the real problem will have found solution.
J. O. F.

CONSTrTUTONAL LAW-FmEEOM OF SPEECa-i-OtiNANCE

RE-

QUIRING BEGISTRATION OF UNION ORGANizERs HELD VioLAv.-D,

a salaried labor organizer, went to the town of Baxley, Georgia, and
there solicited membership in a union without first obtaining a
"license" as provided by a city ordinance. D was arrested and tried
by city officials under authority of the ordinance for soliciting
without the license, she was convicted and a fine and imprisonment
were imposed. The superior court of the county affirmed the conviction, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the superior
court and the supreme court of the state denied certiorari. D appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. Held, the ordinance of the town of Baxley, prohibiting solicitation of members for
an organization without a permit -and making it discretionary with
the mayor and city council as to whether to grant a permit, without any definitive standards or other controlling guides, is invalid as
abridging the guaranty of freedom of speech as secured by the
Constitution of the United States. Staub v. City of Baxley, 78 Sup.
Ct. 277 (1958).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1958

3

